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Cosmological Argument
SCOTT MACDONALD
In Summa theobgiae (ST) 1.2.3 Aquinas says that his first
way of proving the existence of God is clearer (manifestior), seemingly
meaning that it is the clearest of the five ways he will offer. Most
philosophers who have considered the matter, however, have dis-
agreed. The proof from motion has been almost entirely abandoned,
and philosophers from Clarke and Leibniz to Rowe and Swinburne
have preferred versions of the cosmological argument nearer to Aqui-
nas's second or third ways.ι One reason for the neglect of the first way
is that it has been generally supposed to be subject to several obvious,
devastating criticisms, among them that it crucially depends on ar-
chaic physical theory, ancient astrology, and one or more elementary
fallacies. In this paper I argue that the proof from motion can be freed
from the trappings of ancient science and astrology and defended
against the most common of the strictly philosophical criticisms of it.
Having defended the argument against some well-known criticisms, I
argue that it nevertheless fails as an independent proof for God's
existence because it depends for its validity on another of Aquinas's
i. See William L. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1975); and Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1979), chapter 7.
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proofs for God's existence. Commentators have not adequately appre-
ciated the significance of the parasitical nature of the proof from
motion, though Aquinas himself did, as I argue in the final section of
this essay.
I will draw on both of Aquinas's statements of the proof, the "first
way11 found in ST 1.2.3 and the first of the two "Aristotelian" proofs
found in Summa contra gentiles (SCG) 1.13. The SCG and ST state-
ments of the proof differ in two significant respects. First, in the more
detailed discussion in SCG 1.13 Aquinas offers several subarguments
and often gives more than one argument for each point that he thinks
needs justification. By contrast, the ST discussion preserves only some
of those subarguments and incorporates them into the body of the
proof. I discuss only those subarguments that seem to me to be strong-
est and most useful for making my case. Whether or not the subargu-
ments I do not discuss are good arguments seems to me to make no
difference to the points I argue in this paper. All I need to do is to
trace a single defensible strand running through the proof from mo-
tion. The second respect in which the two presentations of the proof
from motion differ is in the statement of the conclusion. The SCG
version of the proof concludes: "Therefore it is necessary to suppose
that there is some primary unmovable mover" (primum movens immo-
bile) , while the conclusion of the proof from ST is apparently weaker:
"Therefore it is necessary to arrive at some primary mover that is not
moved by anything" (primum movens quod a nullo movetur). I think this
second difference is important and I discuss it in the seventh section,
below.
Following the presentation in SCG 1.13, the argument can be
represented as follows:2
1. Everything that is moved is moved by something else.
2. The passage reads: "Everything that is moved [movetur] is moved by something
else. But it is clear from the senses that something—for example, the sun—is moved
[moveri]. Therefore it is moved [movetur] by something else that moves [movente].
Therefore that mover [movens] either is moved [movetur] or not. If it is not moved
[movetur], then we have what we set out to prove, [viz.,] that it is necessary to suppose
that there is some unmovable mover [movens immobile], and we call this God. But if it
is moved [movetur], then it is moved by something else that moves [movente]. There-
fore we either proceed to infinity or arrive at some unmovable mover [movens immo-
bile]. But we cannot proceed to infinity. Therefore it is necessary to suppose that there
is some primary unmovable mover [primum movens immobile]." I have supplied the
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2. Something—call it A—is moved.
3. A is moved by something else—call it B—that moves.
11,2]
4- That mover, B, either (a) is moved or (b) is not moved.
5. If 4b is the case, then there is some unmovable mover,
viz., B.
6. If 4a is the case, then B is moved by something else—
call it C—that moves.
7. If 4a is the case, then one either (a) proceeds to infinity
or (b) reaches some unmovable mover.
8. One cannot proceed to infinity.
9. If 4a is the case, then one must reach some unmovable
mover. [6, 7, 8]
10. There must be some primary unmovable mover. [4, 5, 9]
Aquinas himself sees that two of the premises of the proof—
premises 1 and 8—need to be argued for, and critics have generally
thought that either one or both of these are demonstrably false. In the
second through fifth sections I discuss these premises and some recent,
influential criticisms of them. In the sixth section I examine Aquinas's
apparently unwarranted assumption (in premise 5, for example) that
an unmoved mover is unmovable. This apparent assumption in fact
masks a deep difficulty that exposes the parasitic nature of the proof.
Before turning to the difficulties raised by these three premises, how-
ever, we need to look closely at the proof's observational starting
point, premise 2.
Premise 1 might be thought of as the theoretical premise
that, together with 2—the observation premise—gets the proof off
the ground. Premise 2 draws our attention to certain phenomena in
the world, and 1, a universal proposition that takes as its instances
phenomena of that sort, starts us on a search for causes or explana-
tions. The remainder of the proof is intended to establish that the
Latin corresponding to the various forms of the verb "to move" because I think, as will
emerge, that something of philosophical importance turns on the grammar. I use the
Leonine edition of Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia (Rome, 1882—) except for in libros
Physicorum, where I use the version in Roberto Busa's edition of the Opera (Stuttgart
and Bad Canstatt, 1980).
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search can stop only at some unmovable mover. What sort of phe-
nomena does Aquinas think provide the basis for this cosmological
argument? He says that it is an argument from motion (motus) and
that it is evident to the senses that something is moved (moveri).
What does he understand by "motion" and "being moved"?
Following Aristotle, Aquinas takes motus to be a genus having
three species: local motion, alteration, and increase and decrease
(change in place, quality, and quantity, respectively).3 So motus in-
cludes, but is not limited to, what we would normally call "motion,"
namely, local motion. In the presentation of the argument in ST he
considers a case of alteration (a log on the fire growing hotter), while
in SCG he cites a case of local motion (the sun's moving across the
sky). The proof from motus, then, appears to begin from commonly
observable physical motions and changes.
But we have to be careful not to construe motus too broadly. In the
first place, it does not cover everything we might be willing to call
"change," even though it covers some cases (alteration, for example)
that we would prefer to call "change" rather than "motion." The
coming to be or passing away of substances and so-called mere Cam-
bridge changes—George Bush's changing from not being thought of
by me to being thought of by me—are not instances of motus for
Aquinas.4
In the second place, the way in which the argument proceeds
makes it clear that certain cases of what we would be willing to call
motions or movements have to be excluded from the scope of the
observation premise. We would ordinarily say that anything that
moves is in motion, but it is crucial to the validity of the proof that
there are moving (active) things that are not moved (passive) things;
that is, cases of moving that are not also cases of motus. A case of
motion (motus) is a case of a thing of which we can say that it is moved
or is being moved (movetur)—premise 2—and all such things are
moved by something else—premise 1. But Aquinas denies that a
primary mover is either moved by something else or self-moved, so he
3. In libros Physicorum 5.2. Aquinas points out, however, that sometimes "motion"
is taken more broadly to include coming to be and passing away (see 3.2). In its broad
sense motus is equivalent with mutatio; in its narrower sense it designates a species of
mutatio.
4. Reasons for ruling out cases of these sorts emerge later in this section.
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cannot suppose that a primary mover is moved (movetur) or that its
moving is an instance of motion (motus).5 The proof, then, depends
on a distinction between moving and being moved, and not all in-
stances of moving can be instances of motus.
Given that the proof depends on some sort of distinction between
movers and moved things, it is natural to suppose that Aquinas uses
the passive and active voices of the verb to mark the distinction. One
might suppose, for instance, that when Aquinas claims (in the obser-
vation premise) that something is moved (moveri), he means the
passive voice of the verb to be taken quite literally: something is being
moved (by something that is acting on it). In other words, there is
something that is the passive recipient of motion (from something
that is its active mover).6 Thus, the distinction between moving and
being moved, movers and moved things, on which the argument
depends might be the distinction between active movers (agents that
possess and exercise active causal powers) and passive recipients of
motion (things possessing capacities for being affected by agents ex-
ercising active causal powers). When a man pushes a stone by means
of a stick, for example, the stick and the stone are passive recipients of
motion from the man, who is an active mover. On the basis of a
distinction of this sort Aquinas could exempt certain movers—movers
that only give motion without receiving it—from the general prin-
ciple expressed in premise 1.
5. In the division of the text at the beginning of ST 1.3, Aquinas explicitly denies
that motion (motus) characterizes God, the primary mover.
6. Kenny, however, suggests that Latin uses the passive voice of the verb "to
move" to express either the genuine passive or the intransitive sense of the verb.
Thus, "the sun moves" or "the sun is moving" (intransitive sense) and "the sun is
being moved" (passive sense) would be rendered in Latin by the same form of the
verb—movetur. The passive form of the verb in the observation premise, then, might
indicate only the intransitive sense of "to move." See Anthony Kenny, The Five
Ways: St. Thomas Aquinas s Proofs of God's Existence (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1969), reprint ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), pp. 8 -
9. But the fact that Aquinas cannot allow the observation premise to cover all cases of
intransitive moving shows, I think, that the passive form of the verb there cannot be
taken as expressing the intransitive sense. For similar reasons I reject Blair's suggestion
that the principle expressed in premise 1 be rendered "whatever moves is moved by
another." See George A. Blair, "Another Look at St. Thomas' 'First Way,'" Interna-
tional Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1976): 301-314. Aquinas's conclusion presupposes
the falsity of the principle Blair suggests.
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Of course, taking the passive voice of the verb as marking the
passive side of this distinction between agents and patients will affect
how we understand the proof's opening moves* First, the observation
premise must be read not as the unassailable commonplace that there
are instances of motion broadly speaking, but as the claim that there
are passive recipients of motion. This latter claim is certainly stronger
than the former, but perhaps it too is unobjectionable. The stick and
the stone seem to be straightforwardly passive recipients of motion.
Second, when the passive voice of the verb is taken in the way I
have suggested, the general principle expressed in premise 1 must be
read as the claim that everything that is a passive recipient of motion
is moved by something else. Now it might be objected that this way of
reading the general principle trivializes it, since on this reading, "is
moved" appears to be analytically equivalent to "is moved by some-
thing else."7 But this objection is mistaken. Taking things that ex-
emplify motus as passive recipients of motion analytically entails only
that they are moved by something, but not that they are moved by
something else. In fact Aquinas's arguments in support of premise 1 are
intended to rule out the possibility that things exemplifying motus
might be seif-moved rather than moved by something else. So the
general principle, taken as I have suggested Aquinas intends it, is not
trivial.
The analysis of motion to which Aquinas appeals in support of
premise 1 shows more clearly what he takes to be the significant
features of these instances of motus.
But everything that is moved [movetur] is moved by something else, for
something is moved [movetur] only insofar as it is in potentiality with
respect to that toward which it is moved. But something moves [movet]
insofar as it is in actuality, for to move [mcwere] is nothing other than to
bring something from potentiality to actuality. But something can be
brought from potentiality to actuality only by some being that is in actu-
ality [aliquod ens in actu], . . . But it is not possible for one and the same
thing to be in potentiality and actuality in the same respect at the same
time. . . . Therefore it is impossible that something be a mover [movens]
and a moved thing [motus], or that it move [moveαt] itself, in one and the
same respect. (ST 1.2.3)8
7. Blair makes this claim in "Another Look," p. 301.
8. For the version of this argument in SCG 1.13, see note 18, below.
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I will take up the details of this argument in the next section, but first
I want to focus narrowly on Aquinas's characterization of motion in
terms of potentiality and actuality. He says that something is moved
(movetur) only insofar as it is in potentiality, and that something
moves (movet) only insofar as it is in actuality. The active and passive
forms of the verb apparently mark a distinction that Aquinas explains
in terms of actuality and potentiality.
Aquinas is following Aristotle's characterization of motion (motus),
which he explicates in his commentary on the Physics:
Therefore, one should notice that a thing [can] be entirely in actuality,
entirely in potentiality, or intermediate between potentiality and actu-
ality. Therefore, what is entirely in potentiality is not moved yet [nondum
movetur]; what is already in complete actuality, however, is not being
moved [non movetur] but has already been moved [iam motum est]; there-
fore, that thing is being moved [movetur] which is intermediate between
pure potentiality and pure actuality, which is indeed partly in potentiality
and partly in actuality.
This is clear in the case of alteration, for when water is hot only in
potentiality it is not yet moved; when it has already been heated the
heating motion has been completed; but when it shares in heat to some
degree, but incompletely, it is being moved [movetur] toward heat, for
what becomes hot shares in heat gradually by degrees. Therefore, the
incomplete actuality of heat existing in the heatable thing is itself motion
[motus], not, indeed, insofar as it is in actuality alone, but insofar as what
already exists in actuality is ordered toward further actuality. For if one
were to take away its being ordered toward further actuality, the actuality
itself (however imperfect) would be the terminus of motion [motus] and
not motion [motus], as happens when something heats partially. . . .
Therefore, incomplete actuality has the character [ratio] of motion
[motus], insofar as it is related both as potentiality to a further actuality and
as actuality to something less complete, (in libros Physicorum 3.2)9
This passage highlights three essential features of motion.
First, motion characterizes things that are specifiable in terms of
their being in states of potentiality and actuality. Moreover, to specify
9. In discussing Aristotle's proof from motus in Physics 8, Aquinas refers to this
discussion of motus in book 3 of the Physics; see in libros Physicorum 8.10. (The English
translation of Aquinas's commentary on the Physics seems inadvertently to have
omitted the text I have translated as the last paragraph of this quotation. See Com-
mentary on Aήstoύes Physics, translated by Blackwell, Spath, and Thirlkel [London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963], pp. 136-137.)
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a thing as being in potentiality or actuality is to specify it as being in
potentiality or actuality with respect to something. When Aquinas
says that a thing can be entirely in actuality, entirely in potentiality,
or intermediate between potentiality and actuality, he means that it
can be entirely in potentiality with respect to some state S, entirely in
actuality with respect to some state S, and so forth. Thus, a kettle of
cold water is entirely in potentiality with respect to being hot; a kettle
of boiling water is entirely in actuality with respect to being hot, but
entirely in potentiality with respect to being cold. Aquinas often
leaves unstated the qualification giving the respect in which a thing is
in potentiality or actuality, but there must be some such respect for
any case of motion.
Second, Aquinas explains motus in terms of states of incomplete or
intermediate actuality. These states are characterized as incomplete or
intermediate in virtue of their relations to preceding and succeeding
states of the thing being moved: a thing is in a state of incomplete
actuality when it is in actuality relative to some preceding state of
potentiality but still in potentiality relative to some succeeding state of
(further) actuality. Aquinas says that a thing is being moved when it is
in incomplete actuality with respect to some end-state; that is, when it
is partly in actuality with respect to it but also still ordered toward it as
toward a further actuality. As he says, if one were to take away a
thing's being in the process of attaining further actuality, one could no
longer say that it is being moved (movetur), but only that it has
reached the terminus of the motion.10 Presumably, for similar reasons,
if one were to take away the fact that the thing has already actualized
some potentiality (to some extent), one could no longer say that it is
being moved, but only that it is in the state from which motion
begins.11 Hence, to say that at some time a thing is being moved
10. Of course the actual terminus of the motion might not be the expected or
intended terminus. If I put a kettle of water on the burner intending to bring the water
to a boil, I intend the end-state of this motion (the heating of the water) to be the
state in which the water is boiling. But if my wife, unaware of my intentions, turns the
burner off before the water boils, the actual end-state of the motion in question will be
the water's state at the time she interrupts the heating process.
11. On this analysis, the two termini of a given instance of motion will not be
instants at which the thing can be said to be in motion; they will be extrinsic limits of
the motion. Hence, the state from which motion begins will be the state it is in at the
last instant of rest (there will be no first instant of motion). For discussion of medieval
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involves covert reference to the thing's states at both earlier and later
times. Being moved, then, involves process. Though we might be able
to identify at specific times things that are being moved, their being
moved consists in their being in the process of actualizing potentiality
over an interval of time.
It follows from this second feature of motus that anything that is
being moved thereby has two aspects or can be considered in two
ways. In virtue of being moved a thing is in incomplete actuality with
respect to some end-state, and is thereby in actuality in one respect
and in potentiality in another. It is intermediate between an initial
state (the state of being entirely in potentiality with respect to the
final state) and the final state (the state of being entirely in actuality
with respect to that state). It can be considered relative to either
terminus—as being in actuality (though still incompletely actual in
the relevant respect) or as being in potentiality (though no longer
completely in potentiality in the relevant respect).
Third, when Aquinas says that what is being moved is in poten-
tiality to further actuality he means not just that it could go on from its
present state to a state of further actuality, but that it actually is going
on to a further actuality. The kettle can be taken off the fire when the
water is at 50 degrees, in which case the water at 50 degrees is not in
motion, is not being moved. The state of being 50 degrees is the end-
state of this particular case of motion, the final actuality, and so the
water in this state cannot be said to be in incomplete actuality (with
respect to this end-state).12
These points suggest that we can say of some thing M at some time t
that it is being moved (movetur) if and only if:
a. at t, M is in actuality with respect to some state Sf (an intermedi-
ate state), and
b. in any interval of time (no matter how short) immediately prior
to t, there is an instant at which M was in actuality with respect
analyses of motion and change, see Norman Kretzmann, "Incipit/Desinit," in Motion
and Time, Space and Matter, edited by Peter K. Machamer and Robert G. Turnbull
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), pp. 101-136.
12. This raises a problem about how we could be certain at any given instant
whether or not a thing is being moved, since often we cannot be certain that a thing's
present state is an intermediate state in some process rather than the process's final
state, at which point it would be correct to say that the process had ceased.
128 SCOTT MACDONALD
to state Spr (a prior state not identical with S^ ), and in virtue of
being in actuality with respect to Spr M was in potentiality with
respect to Siy and
c- in any interval of time (no matter how short) immediately after t
there is an instant at which M will be in actuality with respect to
some state Spo (a posterior state not identical with S,-), and in
virtue of being in Sf (and Spr) M is (was) in potentiality with
respect to Spo.
13
When conditions a-c are met, M can be said to be in incomplete
actuality at t because, in virtue of being in Siy M is in actuality relative
to Sp
r
, but still in potentiality with respect to the further actuality Spo.
Of course Spr need not be the state from which a given instance of
motion starts, and Spo need not be the given motion's end-state, but at
any time at which M can be said to be moved there will be states of
this sort. If we let S
e
 be the end-state of a given instance of motion and
Sb be its beginning-state, then we can say that, with respect to this
instance of motion, when M is in Sb it is in complete potentiality with
respect to S
e
, and when it is in S
e
 it is in complete actuality with
respect to S
e
 (though of course, on this analysis, M is being moved at
neither Sb nor S e).1 4
Aquίnas's observation premise will be true, then, just so long as
there are things that satisfy these conditions, and his other claims
about motion and moved things will be true just so long as they are
true of these things.
With this characterization of motus, of what it means to
say that something is moved (movetur), we are now in a position to
13. When Sp,., Sf, and Spo are states involving qualities, the motion will be a case of
alteration. When they involve quantities, it will be a case of increase or decrease.
When they involve spatial location, it will be a case of local motion. Moreover, given
this analysis we can see why coming to be and passing away fail to be cases of motion
strictly speaking: cases of a thing's coming into, or going out of, existence are not
cases in which that thing is in successive states.
14. This analysis exemplifies what Kretzmann has called the strong definition of
motion in his "An Alleged Asymmetry between Rest and Motion: A Reply to Richard
Sorabji's 'Aristotle on the Instant of Change,'" part of an unpublished exchange
between Kretzmann and Sorabji in 1976. One could obtain the corresponding weak
definition by disjoining rather than conjoining conditions b and c. Aquinas seems
clearly committed to the strong definition.
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take up premise 1 of the proof—the claim that everything that is
moved (in the sense specified) is moved by something else. Three
common sorts of objections have been raised against premise 1. First,
it has been claimed that some cases of motion are cases in which what
is moved is moved not by something else, but by itself. Cases of this
sort (animal and plant motion, for instance) constitute counterex-
amples to the general principle; animals and plants are self-movers.15
Second, it has been objected that Aquinas has not established even
the weaker claim that everything that is moved is moved by something.
Why can it not be the case that some things are simply in motion
without being (or having been) moved by anything? Third, if the
general principle is read as the claim that whatever is moved is now
being moved by something else (as it seems it should, for reasons that
will emerge), then cases of projectile motion—a croquet ball rolling
through a hoop, for example—appear to be cases in which what is
moved continues in motion after the causal activity of its mover.
Aquinas defends the general principle expressed in premise 1 in the
passage from ST 1.2.3 that I quoted in the previous section, and that
argument will provide replies to the first two sorts of objection. The
third objection requires separate treatment; I take it up in the fourth
section. The argument from ST 1.2.3 can be elaborated in light of
Aquinas's analysis of motion and represented as follows:
i. Whatever is being moved toward some state S is poten-
tially in S.
ii. Something can be brought from being potentially in S to
being actually in S only by what is in actuality with
respect to S.16
liL Whatever is being moved toward S is being brought to
being actually in S by some being in actuality with re-
spect to S. [i, ii]
iv. To move (movere) is just to bring something from being
potentially in some state to being actually in that state.
v. Whatever moves (moυet) something toward some state is
in actuality with respect to that state, [ii, iv]
15. Kenny, Five Ways, pp. 13, 16, 17.
16. I intend "being in actuality with respect to S" to be broader than "being
actually in S" in important ways that I will explain in section 3, below.
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vi. Whatever is being moved toward S is being moved by
something that moves (movet) it toward S.] [iii, v] 1 7
vii. No one thing can be in potentiality and in actuality in
the same respect at the same time.
Λ viii. Whatever is being moved (movetur) toward S cannot be
identical with what moves (movet) it toward S. [i, v, vii]
ix. Whatever is being moved toward S is being moved by
something else- [iiiy vi, viii]18
Aside from the logical truth expressed in premise vii, the argument
has only three premises. Two of them—i and iv—encapsulate ele-
ments of Aquinas's analysis of motion; the third—premise ii—might
be thought of as a sort of principle of sufficient reason for cases of
motion. Though Aquinas's analysis of motion does not by itself entail
that moved things are passive recipients of motion, that analysis to-
gether with the principle of sufficient reason endorsed in this argu-
ment does entail it. Things that are being moved are in potentiality in
some respect and in the process of having that potentiality actualized;
but potentialities are actualized only by something actual in the rele-
vant respect.19 Similarly, a thing is properly said to move (movere)
when it brings something from potentiality in some respect to actu-
ality in that respect, and only what is in actuality in the relevant
respect can do this.2 0 So moved things, in virtue of being in poten-
17. Kenny has noted that Aquinas's proof from motion diverges from Aristotle's at
this point. The claim expressed in premise vi is Aristotle's conclusion in the Physics,
but Aquinas goes on to argue that everything that is moved must be moved by
something else. See Kenny, Five Ways, pp. 14-15; and Physics 8.4.254b25.
18. In SCG the argument is given as a supporting argument separate from the main
proof: "No one thing is in potentiality and in actuality in the same respect at the same
time. But everything that is moved [movetur], insofar as it is of this sort, is in
potentiality, because motion [motus] is the actuality of a thing existing in potentiality,
insofar as it is of this sort. But everything that moves [movet], insofar as it is of this
sort, is in actuality, because a thing acts only insofar as it is in actuality. Therefore,
nothing is a mover [movens] and a moved thing [motum] with respect to the same
motion [motus]. And so nothing moves [movet] itself" (SCG 1.13). See also In libros
PhysicorumSΛO.
19. See In libros Physicorum 8.10: "It was established in book 3 that what is moved
[movetur] is movable [mobile], i.e., is something existing in potentiality. . . . But that
which moves [movet] is already in actuality, for what is in potentiality is brought to
actuality only by what is in actuality—and this is a mover [movens]."
20. This claim also shows that as Aquinas uses the active voice of the verb in these
contexts it has its transitive sense. That which moves, moves something.
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tiality in the relevant respect, are passive recipients of motion from
movers that are active in virtue of being in actuality in the relevant
respect.
Hence, the analysis of motion that lies behind premises i and iv,
together with the principle of sufficient reason expressed in ii, entails
that whatever is being moved is being moved by something. The role of
vii is to secure the conclusion that what is being moved and what
moves it are distinct; that is, that whatever is being moved is being
moved by something else. Given the analysis of motion, a moved thing
must be in potentiality in the relevant respect and, given the principle
of sufficient reason, what moves it must be in actuality in that respect-
Hence, the moved thing must be distinct from what moves it; a moved
thing cannot be a self-moved thing.
So the argument in support of premise 1, with the analysis of
motion on which it relies, constitutes Aquinas's reply to the first two
sorts of objections raised above. Suppose, with the first objector, that
at t an animal is being moved (movetur) toward S and is being moved
by itself and not by something else. On Aquinas's account, if at t it is
moved toward S, the animal must be (at t) in potentiality with respect
to S; and if at t it moves something (namely, itself) toward S, it must
be (at t) in actuality with respect to S. So the animal that is moved
and moves itself is in potentiality and actuality in the same respect at
the same time, which is impossible. Hence, there cannot be a case of
the sort imagined. Aquinas thinks that self-moving animals in fact
have parts, one of which (the soul) is the mover and the others the
moved things. So Aquinas would be justified in rejecting alleged
counterexamples involving self-moving moved things.21
Kenny objects, however, that even if Aquinas can rule out the
possibility that what is moved is moved by itself, it still does not follow
that it is moved by something else.
If a thing cannot be moved by itself, it does not follow that it must be
moved by something else. Why cannot it just be in motion, without being
moved by anything, whether by itself or anything else? Does not the
2i. But notice that this is an argument only against self-moving moved things. It
shows only that something that is moved (movetur) cannot be the mover of itself. It
does not show that animals, or rather animal souls, cannot be unmoved movers. But
Aquinas need not rule out the possibility that animal souls are unmoved movers in
order to defend premise 1, since it is a claim only about moved things.
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argument need completing with a proof that whatever is in motion is being
moved?22
Kenny directs this objection toward the general principle expressed in
premise 1. Construed in this way, the objection misses the mark.
According to Aquinas, whatever is moved is in potentiality, and
whatever is in potentiality with respect to some state is brought to
actuality only by what is in actuality with respect to that state. Some-
thing's being in motion entails that it is being moved. But perhaps
Kenny's point can be reformulated so that it is not an objection to
premise 1 but to Aquinas's principle of sufficient reason—premise ii of
this subargument. We need, then, to look more closely at ii.
When directed toward premise ii—the claim that some-
thing can be brought from being in potentiality in some respect to
being in actuality in that respect only by what is in actuality in that
respect—Kenny's objection appears to ask for a defense of Aquinas's
version of the principle of sufficient reason. As far as I can see,
Aquinas has no argument to prove the principle. He undoubtedly
thinks it self-evident; and if it needs defense, I cannot give it here.
Nevertheless it is useful to see precisely to what version of the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason Aquinas appeals and what role it plays in the
proof from motion.
The principle stated in premise ii both asserts that certain sorts of
phenomena require a cause (or explanation) and specifies the sort of
cause (or explanation) that is required. Anything brought from poten-
tiality to actuality with respect to state S must have a cause of its being
brought from potentiality to actuality in that respect; the process of
actualizing potentiality requires a cause. According to ii the sort of
cause that can account for a phenomenon of this sort is one that is
itself in actuality with respect to S. The actualizing of a potentiality
requires explanation, and a sufficient explanation will cite the cause of
the actualization, which must itself be in actuality in the relevant
respect.
This version of the principle of sufficient reason is relatively weak.
It does not require an explanation of every state whatever or even of
every moving (movere). It requires an explanation only of changes
22. Kenny, Five Ways, pp. 18—19.
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from potentiality with respect to some state to actuality with respect to
that state,23 The weaker the principle of sufficient reason on which an
argument relies, the better; so it is a virtue of Aquinas's argument for
premise 1 that it relies on a weak version of the principle. But that
principle has work to do in support of other premises of the proof from
motus as well and, as will emerge in section 6, it is doubtful that this
weak version will bear all the weight imposed by a proof for God's
existence. It is strong enough, however, to fulfill its role in support of
premise 1. If we are willing to grant it, it seems to me that Aquinas's
opening moves succeed: everything that is moved must be moved by
something else.
Recent commentators, however, have offered reasons other than
general worries about any such principle for thinking Aquinas's ver-
sion of it false. Kenny, for instance, thinks that there are clear counter-
examples to it. He has suggested taking Aquinas's principle as the
claim that something can be brought from being potentially F to being
actually F only by something that is actually F . 2 4 There certainly are
cases of change in which what is actually F brings something else from
being potentially F to being actually F. The oven's actually being 350
degrees, for example, brings the cake from being 350 degrees merely in
potentiality to being actually 350 degrees. But the principle does not
fit other cases: a farmer who fattens oxen need not himself be fat, and
murders are not committed by dead men.2 5
Aquinas, however, has two reasons for rejecting these putative
counterexamples. First, he denies that a cause must have the same
actuality or form as its effect. On his view there are two ways in which
a cause and its effect might fail to have the same actuality. First, the
effect might have the same nature as the cause but have it to a lesser
degree. The heat acquired by the cake in the oven is of the same
nature as the heat possessed by the oven, though the oven may be at
23. Rowe has distinguished between two versions of the principle of sufficient
reason. A strong version maintains that the existence of anything whatsoever requires
an explanation; a weaker version maintains that only the coming into existence of
things needs explanation (see Rowe, Cosmoϊogical Argument, chapter 2). The prkv
ciple at work in premise ii is neither of these, since Aquinas is concerned about
potentialities being brought to actuality rather than about things coming into exis^
tence, but it is in the same spirit as the second, weaker version.
24. Kenny, Five Ways, p. 21.
25. The counterexamples are Kenny's in Five Ways, pp. 21-22.
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350 degrees and the cake only at 300 degrees.26 Second, the effect
might have, not the same nature as its cause, but a nature with less
actuality. Aquinas calls causes that have a different nature from their
effects "equivocal" causes.27 God is an equivocal cause of the things he
makes. God is the cause of inanimate objects but is not himself an
inanimate object; God's nature is such that he has greater actuality
than inanimate objects.28
Now, if we draw a distinction between being in actuality with
respect to S and being actually in S, we can understand premise ii in
such a way as to leave room for the sorts of cases Aquinas has in mind.
We might say that a thing is in actuality with respect to S if it is either
actually in S or in a state S * where S * is a state of greater actuality
than S. Thus, if we let C be the cause of some object's coming to be in
state S (where S admits of degrees), then C can be in actuality with
respect to S to degree n in at least three ways: either by being actually
in S to degree n, by being actually in S to some degree greater than n,
or by being in some state S* with greater actuality than S.29
26. In light of cases of this sort, Kenny suggests altering the principle to "A can
make B become F^er, only if A is itself F-er than B" (Five Ways, p. 22).
27. "Effects that fall short of their causes do not agree with them in name and
nature. Yet some likeness must be found between them since it belongs to the nature
of action that an agent produces its like (since each thing acts according as it is in
actuality). Therefore, the form of an effect is certainly found in some measure in a
transcending cause. . . . For this reason the cause is called an equivocal cause" (SCG
1.29). See also ST 1.4.3.
28. This requires us to understand Aquinas's notion of a hierarchy of natures,
which I cannot develop here.
29. Patricia Matthews has objected that once one grants my distinction between a
thing's being in actuality with respect to some state and its being actually in that state,
premise vii no longer seems to be a logical truth and in fact seems false. On that
distinction, a thing that is not actually in S might be in actuality with respect to S and
potentially in S at the same time. At time t an oven might be at 350 degrees, and so in
actuality with respect to being 300 degrees and also in potentially with respect to
being 300 degrees (since the oven can cool to 300 degrees). There seem to me to be
two different ways of replying to this objection. First, one might restrict the concepts
of actuality and potentiality in such a way that one can say that at t, x is in potentiality
with respect to S only if it is the case that x is not in S at C and can come to be in S after
t and that x can come to be in S only by virtue of acquiring real or positive properties.
On this line, the oven at 350 degrees could not be said to be in potentiality with
respect to being 300 degrees because the oven can come to be at 300 degrees only by
virtue of losing heat or energy. (The oven that is cooling, then, is not being moved
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So premise ii must be read in light of Aquinas's doctrine of equivo-
cal causes. Second, its application must be restricted to cases of imme'
diate causation. Aquinas can reply to the case of the fattened oxen,
for example, by denying that the farmer is the proper and immediate
cause of the oxen's growing fat; the nutritive faculties of an ox's soul
are the cause of its growing fat—an animaΓs soul has sufficient actu-
ality to cause (equivocally) certain effects in the animaΓs body. (Of
course the farmer is a remote cause by virtue of his providing hay for
his oxen, for example.) Similarly, a murderer is not the proper and
immediate cause of his victim's death, though he may be the imme-
diate cause of an alteration in the body of the victim, an alteration he
has sufficient actuality to bring about.30
Cases of local motion, however, are more difficult to accommo-
date. Premise ii appears to commit Aquinas to holding that something
that is being moved from position A to position B (and so is in poten-
tiality with respect to being at position B) must be moved by some-
thing else that is in actuality with respect to position B, i.e., that is
actually at position B. But this seems clearly wrong. This objection to
premise ii is closely related to the third objection to premise 1 that I
raised in the second section, so I will discuss them together.
The argument for premise 1 that was laid out in the
previous section requires us to take the premise as the claim that
whatever is being moved is (now) being moved by something else. But
cases of projectile motion seem to be cases of things that need not be
moved by something else during the whole interval in which they are
in motion. Something may be required initially to impart motion to a
projectile, but after having been moved initially the projectile con-
[moveri] though it is moving [movere]; the surrounding environment is being moved.)
Second, one might allow that the oven that is cooling from 350 to 300 degrees is
being moved, but maintain that what counts as being in actuality with respect to some
state depends on the direction of the motion toward that state. When the state of
being at 300 degrees is the end'State of a process of cooling, things that are 300
degrees or cooler will count as being in actuality with respect to that state; when that
state is the end-state of a process of heating, things that are 300 degrees or hotter will
count as being in actuality with respect to it. On this line, the oven that is cooling
will not count as being in actuality with respect to being at 300 degrees.
30. I am grateful to Alfred Freddoso for suggestions along these lines.
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tinues in motion without continually being moved. So projectile mo-
tion constitutes a counterexample to premise 1.
Aquinas apparently mistakenly believed that the medium through
which a projectile moves—for example, the air through which a ball
is thrown—continues to move it.31 This belief would explain why he
did not see projectile motion as a difficulty for premise 1 (the air
continues to move the ball after it has been released by the thrower) or
local motion in general as a difficulty for premise ii (the medium
stretches all the way to the end-point of the motion, and so is actually
at the end-point). But of course, this explanation of local and pro-
jectile motion essentially depends on archaic physical theory.
I think these are genuine counterexamples to the respective prin-
ciples, understood as Aquinas understood them, but it seems to me
quite easy nevertheless to salvage Aquinas's argument. We can simply
restrict premises 1 and 2 of the proof to a narrower range of cases than
Aquinas intended, a range that excludes cases of local motion (and
projectile motion as a subclass of local motion). The observation
premise, then, would appeal not to motus generally but only to certain
sorts of motus; premise 1 would claim that things that are now being
moved in these particular ways are now being moved by something
else. By restricting the range of the observation premise and the prin-
ciple expressed in premise 1 we would be sacrificing generality. Still,
provided there are some members of the domain to which we appeal,
premises 1 and 2 will be true and the argument can proceed. Aquinas
was misled by a false physical theory to overstate his case, but it seems
easy enough to restrict his claim in relevant respects.
In fact, there are good reasons, ones that Aquinas acknowledges,
for distinguishing local motion, on the one hand, from alteration and
increase and decrease, on the other. Once that distinction is made we
will have grounds for restricting the proof from motion to the latter
sorts of motus j and we will be able to see how the principle expressed
by Aquinas's premise 1 can be brought into line with modern physics.
Local motion involves change in place, and a thing subject to local
motion changes in virtue of changes in characteristics that belong to
the category of place. Characteristics in the category of place, how-
ever, characterize their subjects only extrinsically; that is, a subject is
characterized by a predicate in the category of place in virtue of its
31. See Kenny, Five Ways, p. 16.
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spatial location, and its spatial location is wholly extrinsic to the
subject considered in itself32 Alteration and increase and decrease,
on the other hand, involve changes grounded in characteristics from
the categories of quality and quantity (respectively), and these sorts of
characteristics characterize their subjects intrinsically.33 So alteration
and increase and decrease require an ontological ground in the subject
considered in itself, whereas local motion does not. This can serve as
the basis for a distinction between the former two species of motion
and the latter. I will call instances of motion grounded in changes of
intrinsic characteristics "motion*" (motus*).3* Motion* is a species of
motion but not a lowest species, since it is the genus for alteration and
increase and decrease. By restricting the proof from motion to mo-
tion*, we will be able to rule out counterexamples involving local and
projectile motion.
Having excluded local motion from the scope of the argument,
however, it is worth noticing that cases involving projectile motion
typically do involve elements that are genuine instances of motion*.
When I throw a ball through the air, my arm imparts momentum to
the ball. The balΓs acquisition of momentum is a case of motion*
(provided the acquisition is a process satisfying conditions a-c of the
analysis of motion) since it involves a change in the ball's intrinsic
characteristics.35 Moreover, when I release the ball its momentum is
32. As Alfred Freddoso has pointed out to me, not all scholastic philosophers were
in agreement on this point.
33. Aquinas distinguishes between types of change based on an intrinsic change
(alteration, increase and decrease, and generation and corruption) and types of
change based on extrinsic change (local motion) in his commentary on Aristotle's
Metaphysics 12.7 (Cathala-Spiazzi no. 2530). Following Aristotle, he takes local
motion to be the primary sort of change precisely because a thing that changes only in
place does not suffer intrinsic change. (I take it that local motion is the primary sort of
change because it requires the least change.) For more detailed discussion of the
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics and intrinsic and extrinsic
change, see "The Metaphysics of Goodness and the Doctrine of the Transcendentals,"
in Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theol-
ogy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 31-55.
34. In terms of the analysis of motion in section 1 above, we can state this
restriction as a restriction to cases of motion satisfying conditions a-c in which the
states in question (S^, S,, and Spo) are either qualitative or quantitative states of M.
35. Presumably an adherent of medieval impetus theory, and perhaps Aquinas,
could accept an account along these lines.
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gradually reduced by the friction of the air through which it travels,
and that gradual change in the balΓs momentum might also be a case
of motion*.3 6 The observation premise of the proof from motion*,
then, might appeal to the balΓs acquisition or loss of momentum, but
not to the balΓs local motion, as a starting point for the proof.
So the critics are right to point out that some of the grounds on
which Aquinas holds premises 1 and ii do not support them, but they
are wrong to suppose that these principles are thereby undermined.
In the rest of this paper I will leave local motion out of consideration
and assume that any objections based on features peculiar to it are
irrelevant. As long as there are some cases of motus * to which Aqui-
nas's analysis applies—the fire heating the water in the kettle, for
instance—the argument can proceed. (From now on when I use the
terms "motion" and "being moved," I understand them as restricted to
what I have just now been calling motion*.)
Aquinas's denial that there can be an infinite series of
moved movers—premise 8—is the other premise besides 1 that Aqui-
nas argues for in some detail and that commentators have found most
objectionable. In the statement of the first way in ST Aquinas says:
But this [series of moved movers] cannot proceed to infinity because then
there would be no primary mover [pήmum movens]. Consequently, there
would be no other mover [movens] either, because secondary movers [mo-
ventia secunda] move [movent] only in virtue of the fact that they are moved
[sunt mota] by a primary mover. For example, a stick moves [movet] only in
virtue of the fact that it is moved [est motus] by a hand. (ST 1.2.3)
It has been objected that this argument is fallacious since it does
not follow from the denial of a primary (or first) mover in a series that
no other things in the series can move or be moved. Of course, if one
denies that there is a first mover in a finite series of movers, the motion
cannot get started, as it were, and any potential secondary movers will
remain merely potential movers. One way of denying that there is a
first mover, however, is by maintaining that the series in question is
infinite, in which case there will be no first mover, but an infinite
number of movers nevertheless. Aquinas is not entitled to assume that
36. But see note 29, above, for a reason for denying that the loss of momentum is a
case of motion*.
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the series in question is finite. Hence the argument either begs the
question or turns on an equivocation regarding "denying that there is a
first mover." 3 7
I think that this objection is misguided. Aquinas cannot intend the
argument to rule out the possibility of an infinite series of causes or
movers of just any sort, since he thinks that certain sorts of infinite
series are at least possible. He admits, for example, that an infinite
line of human ancestors extending back in time is at least a possibil-
ity. What sort of infinite regress, then, is Aquinas's argument sup-
posed to block?
In ST Aquinas distinguishes between causal series ordered per se
and causal series ordered per accidensy and it is clear that he means to
claim that an infinite series is impossible only in series ordered per se: 3 8
It must be said that as regards efficient causes it is impossible to go on ad
infίnitum per se. For example, if causes that are required per se for some
effect were multiplied ad infinitum > such as if a stone were moved by a
stick, the stick by a hand, and so on ad infinitum. But it is not thought to
be impossible to go on ad infinitum in the case of per accidens efficient
causes. For example, if each of the causes that are multiplied ad infinitum
possesses an order with respect to [only] one [other] cause, their multi-
plication is per accidens. The smith, for example, works by means of many
hammers per accidens because one after another breaks. Therefore, it is
accidental to this hammer that it works after the action of another ham-
mer. Similarly, it is accidental to this man, insofar as he generates an-
other, that he has been generated by another; for he generates insofar as
he is a man and not insofar as he is the son of another man. . . . Thus, it is
37. This objection has been raised or discussed by Paul Edwards, "The Cosmologi-
cal Argument," The Rationalist Annual 1959, reprinted in Readings in Philosophy of
Religion, edited by Baruch Brody (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp.
71-83; C. J. F. Williams, "Hie autem non est procedere in infinitum," Mind 69
(1960): 403-405; Patterson Brown, "Infinite Causal Regression," The Philosophical
Review 75 (1966): 510-525; Kenny, Five Ways, p. 26; and Rowe, Cosmological Argu-
ment, pp. 18-37.
38. Commentators who have recognized that Aquinas's argument against an infi-
nite causal regress depends on this distinction have appealed to Scotus for an explicit
account of the distinction. See, for example, Brown, "Infinite Causal Regression," pp.
218-227; and, following him, R. G. Wengert, "The Logic of Essentially Ordered
Causes," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 12 (1971): 406-422; as well as Rowe,
Cosmological Argument, pp. 23-29. It seems to me, however, that there is plenty of
evidence in Aquinas for constructing such an account, as will emerge.
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not impossible that a man be generated by [another] man ad infinitum. But
it would be impossible if the generation of this man depended on that man
and on an elementary body and on the sun and so on ad infinitum. (ST
1.46.2.ad 7)
In order to evaluate premise 8, then, we will need to be clear about
the distinction between these two kinds of causal series.
In this passage and in many other places, Aquinas takes over AriS'
totle's example of a man's being generated by a man and by the sun.
The example has led some commentators to suppose that the distino
tion between two sorts of causal series rests on ancient astrology,
according to which the heavenly bodies are causes of events in the
sublunary world.39 But the distinction seems to me not to depend
crucially on astrology and to be defensible apart from such examples.
Aquinas draws the distinction in different ways in different pas-
sages. In the passage quoted just above, the distinction is between
causal series in which prior causes are ordered to only one other
posterior cause (or effect) and those in which the prior causes are
ordered to all the posterior causes (and effects). Imagine the causal
series D-causes-C-causes-B-causes-A. In a series of this sort D is or-
dered to C, C is ordered to B, and B is ordered to A. Now, Aquinas
suggests that causal series ordered per se are ones in which some prior
cause is ordered to all the other causes (and effects) posterior to it.
Thus, if our imagined causal series is ordered per se, it will be the case,
not only that D causes C, C causes B, and B causes A, but also that D
causes B and D causes A. Consider a case in which a fire heats a kettle,
which in turn heats the water contained in it.40 In this case the fire
moves (heats) the kettle and also the water (by means of the kettle),
and so the fire is ordered to both the kettle and the water.
Causal series ordered per accidens, on the other hand, are such that
each cause is ordered to only one other posterior cause (or effect).
Thus, if our causal series is such that D causes C, C causes B, and B
causes A, but it is not the case that D causes B and D causes A, then it
39. See Kenny, Five Ways, pp. 43-44; J. L. Mackie repeats Kenny's appraisal in
The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 87.
40. Aquinas's own example—a hand moving a stick, which moves a stone—
involves local motion. For the reasons given in the fourth section, I am restricting the
discussion to cases of alteration and increase and decrease. I think my example
involving alteration captures what Aquinas takes to be essential in his.
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will be a series in which each cause is ordered to only one other cause
(or effect); hence, it will be a causal series ordered per accidens. Aqui-
nas offers a genealogical series as an example of a causal series ordered
per accidens. He thinks that if Abraham causes Isaac, who causes
Jacob, it is not the case that Abraham causes Jacob; Abraham is
ordered to only one other cause (or effect) in the series—to Isaac.
Of course there is at least some sense in which Abraham can be said
to be one (if not the only) cause of Jacob, as well as of Isaac, so it
might seem as if Aquinas's distinction collapses,41 But Aquinas's
characterization of the distinction in other passages helps to clarify his
view. Elsewhere he characterizes the distinction as being between
causal series in which the posterior causes exercise their causal power
solely in virtue of the power of a prior cause (those ordered per se) and
those in which the posterior causes exercise their own proper causal
power (those ordered per accidens).*2 One might think of the kettle
that heats the water as being under the (causal) control of the fire that
moves it; it is not exercising a causal power it has independently of the
fire, Isaac, on the other hand, possesses his own causal power and can
exercise it of his own accord. He is an independently existing human
41. For commentators who have taken Aquinas's characterization of causal series
ordered per se to depend on taking prior causes as antecedent necessary conditions, see
Kenny, Five Ways, p. 43; and Anthony Flew, God and Philosophy (New York: Delta
Books, 1967), paragraph 4.26. I claim that we might be willing to say that Abraham
causes Jacob since Abraham's causal activity is a necessary condition of Isaac's causing
Jacob- Brown, however, argues in support of the intransitivity of causal series ordered
per accidens by claiming that we cannot say that Abraham begets Jacob, but only that
Abraham begets Isaac; thus, "begetting" is an intransitive causal relation ("Infinite
Causal Regression," pp. 226-227). But Brown's argument depends on the (irrelevant)
fact that some ways of describing a particular causal relation may yield intransitivity,
while other ways of describing the same causal relation may yield transitivity. For
example, suppose my hand is pushing a stick to which is attached a string with a stone
tied on the other end. When I push the stick, the stone is pulled along by the string
that trails along behind the end of the stick. Aquinas would clearly take the case I
have just described as a causal series ordered per se: the hand moves the stick and also
moves the string and the stone. Hence, the causal relation (described as "moves") is
transitive. But if I say not that the hand moves the stick, but that it pushes the stick,
the relation is no longer transitive because the hand does not push the string or the
stone—which are being pulled by the stick.
42. For example, "secondary movers move only in virtue of the fact that they are
moved by a primary mover" (ST 1.2.3); "a secondary mover cannot move apart from a
primary [mover]" (in libros Physicorum 8.9).
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being possessing his own causal powers, and he begets Jacob by ex-
ercising those causal powers.
Aquinas often characterizes the secondary causes in causal series
ordered per se as instruments, as in this passage from his commentary
on the Physics.
Further, [Aristotle] claimed above that the last mover does not move
without the primary [mover]. . . . In this passage he says instead that it is
impossible that that by means of which something moves [something else],
as by an instrument, move anything without the principal mover which
moved it; for example, the stick without the hand, (in libros Pkysicorum
8.9)
He tells us what he means by "instrument" in the following passage:
Now a thing works for the production of an effect in two ways. In one
way, as a per se agent, where that which acts by means of some form
inhering in it in the manner of a complete nature (whether it has that
form from itself or from something else, whether naturally or violently) is
said to act per se. . . . In another way, a thing is said to work for the
production of an effect instrumentally, where that thing does not work for
the production of the effect by means of a form inhering in it, but only
insofar as it is moved [motum] by a per se agent.
For it is the nature [ratio] of an instrument insofar as it is an instrument
that, having been moved, it moves [moveat motum]. Thus, the motion
[motus] by which [the instrument] is moved by the principal agent is
related to the instrument as the complete form is related to the per se
agent. (De veritate 27.4)
In some causal series, then, the posterior causes are mere instruments
by which a prior cause produces an effect. In such series the causal
power of a prior cause—say D—is carried all the way through the
other, posterior causes in the series to the final effect—A—so that
one can say that D (per se and immediately) causes A. And, although
each of the posterior causes can be said to be a cause, none exerts a
causal power of its own but merely transmits the causal power of the
prior cause. Because it is D's causal power that causes A, the causal
series is ordered per se; one and the same causal power is at work
through all the links in the series.43 So when Aquinas says that sec-
43. In his commentary on the Liber de causis, Aquinas says that a causal series
ordered per se is one in which the intention (intentio) of the primary cause is referred
(respicit) all the way to the last effect through all the intermediate causes. Though he
uses the word "intention" in this description, he seems not to mean that the primary
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ondary causes (in causal series ordered per se) act only in virtue of the
power of a primary cause, he does not mean only that the activity of a
prior cause is some sort of necessary condition of the activity of the
posterior causes. He means further that the posterior causes are exercising
no independent causal power in the causing of the relevant effect.
In other causal series, by contrast, a different causal power is at
work at each link in the series. Abraham's causal power is at work in
the production of Isaac, but it is Isaac's causal power and not Abra^
ham's that is at work in the production of Jacob. Causal series of this
latter sort are ordered per accidens because there is no single causal
power uniting the series. Isaac is not the instrument by which Abra-
ham causes Jacob, but an independent cause with independent causal
power.44
Given that causal series ordered per se are series in which a primary
cause causes some effect by means of purely instrumental secondary
causes, and given Aquinas's conception of purely instrumental causes,
we can see why Aquinas claims that causal series ordered per se cannot
go on to infinity. The instrumental secondary causes in series of this
sort exercise no independent causal power, and so they cannot in
themselves adequately account for the effect.
It might seem, however, that once all this is granted, our paradigm
case of a causal series ordered per se (the fire heating the kettle, which
causes in such series must be beings capable of having intentions and that they must in
fact intend the last effect in the series. He holds rather that the causal power of the
primary cause is directed towards the final effect, whether by intention or nature or
whatever.
44. Brown has focused on the transitivity of the causal relation as the key to
identifying and understanding causal series ordered per se, but I think transitivity is
not a sufficient condition of a causal series's being ordered per se. A man who lights a
match which lights a fuse which ignites explosives which demolish a building can
himself be said to cause the demolition of the building, but this is not a causal series
ordered per se on Aquinas's account. Aquinas's view seems to be that a causal series
ordered per se is a series in which the only independent causal power at work is the
causal power of the primary cause. In the case of the hand moving the stick that
moves the stone, the stick exercises no independent power; it is merely an instrument
or a vehicle through which the hand exercises its causal power. In the case of the
demolition of the building, however, the match, the fuse, and the explosives exercise
their own causal powers. The match, the fuse, and the explosives, of course, would
not exercise their causal powers were it not for the man's causality, but they are not
merely instruments for his causal power.
144 SCOTT MACDONALD
heats the water) fails to satisfy the conditions for being a causal series
of that sort- In our paradigm case the kettle appears not to be a purely
instrumental cause since, according to the passage from De veritate, an
instrumental cause causes not by means of a form inhering in it but
only insofar as it is moved by an agent that acts per se. But the kettle
has a temperature of its own (even if it was caused by the fire to have
that specific temperature), and so it has a form of heat inhering in it
and heats the water by means of that form. It seems, then, that the
kettle in the paradigm case is not a purely instrumental cause, and the
causal series described in that case seems not to be ordered per se.
Indeed, we might wonder whether there are any genuine examples of
causal series ordered per se.
If we look more closely at the paradigm case, keeping in mind
Aquinas's analysis of motion, we can see how Aquinas's account of
secondary, instrumental causes avoids this difficulty. Suppose that the
water in the kettle is being brought to a boil by the fire, and suppose
that S
e
 designates that end-state. Given that the case is an instance of
a causal series ordered per se, the water (the last effect) is being moved
toward S
e
, and so it is in potentiality with respect to S
e
. The kettle (a
secondary, instrumental cause) is moving the water, but it also is
being moved toward S
e
, and so is in potentiality with respect to S
e
.
The fire (the primary cause) is only moving and is not also being
moved toward S
e
, and so it is in actuality with respect to S
e
. Now, so
long as the kettle is being moved toward S
e
 (even if it also moves the
water), it cannot be the explanation of the water's being moved to-
ward S
e
. This is because only what is in actuality with respect to S
e
 can
bring the water from being potentially in S
e
 to being actually in S
e
,
and ex hypothesi the kettle is not in actuality with respect to S
e
. If it is
in fact true that the water is being moved to S
e
, and if Aquinas's
principle of sufficient reason is true, then only the fire, which is in
actuality with respect to S
e
, can account for the water's being moved
in this way.
To see this more clearly, imagine that at time t during the process of
the water's being heated continuously from 0 to 100 degrees the kettle
is at 50 degrees. At t the water will have a temperature less than or
equal to that of the kettle. The kettle and its states at t explain the
water's having (or having come to have) the temperature it does at t.
They can explain this because the kettle is in actuality with respect to
the relevant state of the water at t. But the kettle and its states at ί
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cannot account for its being the case that the water is being heated to
100 degrees. The kettle's being at 50 degrees is not the cause of the
fact that the water at t is ordered toward that further actuality. Only
the fire, which at t is in actuality with respect to the further actuality,
being at 100 degrees, can account for that fact.
So even if the kettle in our paradigm case possesses an inhering
form (its temperature), and moves the water by means of that form, it
is not in virtue of the kettle and its inhering forms that the water is
being moved to 100 degrees. What is essential to the kettle's being an
instrumental cause in this particular case of motion is its lacking, at
some time during the interval of motion, the form or actuality neces^
sary to bring the motion to its end-state. The kettle is a mover that is
itself being moved toward the end-state. So the kettle, like the water,
is in potentiality with respect to the end-state, and hence lacks the
actuality required of an explanation of the water's being moved to that
end-state.45 This is what Aquinas means, I think, when he says that
an instrumental cause "does not work for the production of the effect
by means of a form inhering in it, but only insofar as it is moved by a
per se agent" (De veήtate 27.4)-46
It is clear, then, that Aquinas thinks that causal series in which at
least one effect is something that is being moved (movetur) are causal
series ordered per se.47 The observation premise 2 is meant to call our
45. When the kettle itself reaches 100 degrees it will no longer be the case that it is
being moved toward that state; it will have already been moved to it. So it will be in
actuality in the respect necessary for bringing the water to that temperature.
46. In ST 1.45.5 Aquinas makes it clear that instrumental secondary causes may
possess an inhering form that gives them certain causal powers. These powers may
play a role in the production of the final effect but are not of the right sort to account
for its realization. The example there is of a saw that cuts wood by virtue of its own
form, thereby producing the form of a bench, which is nevertheless the proper effect
of the craftsman, who is the primary cause. I am grateful to Alfred Freddoso for
pointing this passage out to me.
47. "One finds three things in [cases of] motion [motu]: (1) the movable thing that
is moved [movetur], (2) something else that is the mover [movens]; and (3) an instru-
ment by which the mover moves [movet]" (In libros Physicorum, 8.9). See also in libros
Metaphysίcorum 12.6 (Cathala-Spiazzi no. 2517). In In libros Physicorum 8.9, and in
the passage from ST 1.46.2 ad 7 that I quoted above, Aquinas points out that in a
given series ordered per se there might be no secondary causes or an infinite number of
secondary causes. In either case there must be a primary cause on the causal power of
which each secondary cause (if there are any) depends.
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attention to an effect in a causal series ordered per se, and the two main
theoretical premises 1 and 8 are meant (respectively) to show that there
must be at least one mover in a series of this sort and that not all movers
in such a series can be secondary, purely instrumental movers.
It is important to see that this argument against an infinite regress
differs from two superficially similar kinds of argument that appear in
cosmological proofs. One sort of argument claims that a secondary
cause can serve as a sufficient explanation of a thing's being moved,
but that the motion of the secondary cause itself must be explained.
Thus, in one's explanation of the first phenomenon one introduces a
second phenomenon that needs explaining. Hence, even though the
first case is explained, we are left with something else to explain. If
there is no primary cause, there will be an infinite number of things to
explain; and where there is no end to the explaining, there is no
adequate explanation. The second sort of argument claims that there
may be an infinite series of secondary, dependent causes, each ex^
plaining the next, but that one will still need an explanation of the
series as a whole, and any such explanation must appeal to some
primary cause outside the series itself.48
Aquinas's argument against an infinite regress as I have just sketched
it is of neither of these kinds. He thinks that citing a secondary
mover is not an adequate explanation of some thing's being moved.
It is not that an explanation of this sort explains, but at the cost of
introducing something further to be explained; it is that it does not
explain. One must find a primary mover in order to explain some
thing's being moved.
It seems to me, then, that the most common objections
to premises 1 and 8 of Aquinas's proof from motion can be met. There
is, however, another problem for the proof. Assuming that Aquinas
can block a regress in the case of movers and things moved, why must
the primary mover be not just unmoved, but unmovable? Aquinas
thinks that if the mover of some moved thing is not itself moved, it is
an unmovable mover (premises 5 and 7). What justification does he
have for supposing that an unmoved mover is unmovable?
The sort of causal series he has in mind in the proof from mo-
48. Blair mistakenly takes Aquinas's first way to be an argument of this sort
("Another Look," pp. 303-304).
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tion has as a member something, M, that is being moved. M's going
from being in potentiality with respect to some state S to being in
actuality with respect to S needs to be explained by some primary
mover, P. All that is required of P is that it be in actuality with respect
to S; P's being in actuality with respect to S is what makes P the
primary mover in this causal series ordered per se. So in order to
count as a primary mover, as the stopping point in a causal series
ordered per se, P must be unmoved (because it is in actuality) in the
relevant respect. But it does not follow from this that P must be
unmoved (and hence in actuality) in all respects. If P were in actuality
in all respects, P would be absolutely unmoved and unmovable, but
the fact that P is unmoved with respect to some state S does not entail
that P is unmovable.49
Given that Aquinas's argument so far has shown only that there
must be some primary mover that is in actuality in the respect relevant
to the particular case of motion at hand, it seems likely that there will
be very many relatively uninteresting primary movers. The fire in our
paradigm case seems to be a suitable primary mover, animals (or their
souls) might be unmoved movers, and some of Aquinas's own examples
of causal series ordered per se apparently have human beings filling
the role of primary mover, at least as Aquinas describes them.50 We
might call fire, animals, human beings, and other natural unmoved
movers (if there are any) mundane primary movers. The problem,
then, is that the proof from motion gives us no reason to suppose there
are any primary movers other than mundane primary movers.51
In at least some contexts, Aquinas seems to be aware of the prob^
lem of mundane primary movers. In stating the second of the two
"Aristotelian" proofs in SCG> he takes up the possibility that animals
or human beings are unmoved movers. The second "Aristotelian"
proof proceeds in two stages. Aquinas argues first that there is a
primary mover, and then that this mover is absolutely unmovable
and separate. Aquinas begins the second stage of the argument: "But
49. Kenny raises an objection of this sort in Five Ways, p. 23.
50. See In libros Physicorum 8.9: "Therefore, the man of himself is the primary
mover, and he moves the stone through several intermediaries."
51. See Blair, "Another Look," pp. 310-311.
52. See in libros Physicorum 8.12, where Aquinas makes the same claim about
Aristotle's strategy.
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Aristotle proceeds further . . . because from the conclusion that there
is a primary mover that is not moved [non movetur] by anything exte-
rior to it it does not follow that it is completely unmovable" (SCG
1.13,21),52 He repeats the arguments from the first "Aristotelian"
proof against the position that the primary mover is a self-moved
moved thing and then offers four arguments to show that the primary
mover must be absolutely unmovable. The first three of these four
arguments closely follow the text of Physics 8 (258b23 ff.);53 the last is
drawn from Metaphysics 12.
The general strategy of the first three arguments is to show that the
existence of primary movers that are movable in some respect (mun-
dane primary movers) entails the existence of a primary mover mov-
able in no respect. The first of these arguments, for example, argues
that mundane primary movers are corruptible (or contingent), and so
must be explained by appeal to something incorruptible, which will be
an unmovable mover.54 The third argues that there must be some
eternal (beginningless) mover, since motion is eternal, but no mun-
dane primary mover can be an eternal mover (each mundane primary
mover's moving begins). Mundane movers cannot be eternal movers
because even if they are not moved per se and so do not depend on
another mover for the very causal power by which they move, they are
moved per accidens and so depend on other things in order to move,
though not for the very causal power by which they move. Animals
that are primary movers with respect to some local motion, for instance,
are moved per accidens in that they depend on nutritive processes such
as digestion and breathing in order to initiate local motion.55
I cannot evaluate these arguments from contingency here. I want
only to point out that they are themselves cosmological proofs essen-
tially different from the proof from motion. Their starting points are
the existence of corruptible beings of a certain sort or the begin-
ninglessness of motion, not the fact that some particular thing—the
sun in the sky or the log on the fire—is moved. It appears that the
53. See in libros Physicorum 8.12-13.
54. SCG 1.13.24; see In libros Physicorum 8.12. Compare In libros Metaphysicorum
12.6 (Cathala-Spiazzi no. 2501).
55. SCG 1.13.26; see in libros Physicorum 8.13. In in libros Metaphysicorum 12.5
(Cathala-Spiazzi no. 2494), Aquinas connects the argument from corruptibility with
the argument from the eternity of motion.
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proof starting from an instance of motus and relying on the weak
version of the principle of sufficient reason I have discussed can get us
only as far as mundane primary movers. The proof for an absolutely
unmovable mover must take a different phenomenon as its starting
point and will require a different version of the principle of sufficient
reason.56 If these arguments from contingency are the only bridges
Aquinas has from mundane primary movers to an unmovable primary
mover, then the proof from motion must contain another cosmologi-
cal argument—perhaps the third way—as an integral part. These
other cosmological arguments might stand on their own, but the proof
from motion is invalid without one of them. Of course, this is not to
say that the proof from motion fails; it is just to say that it is parasitic
on another version of the cosmological argument.
Of the four arguments for an absolutely unmovable mover that are
offered in SCG, however, the last suggests another argument that
might be construed as an attempt to bridge the gap between mundane
primary movers and the unmovable primary mover. Following Aris-
totle, Aquinas takes animals and human beings to be composed of an
unmoved moving part, the soul, and a moved part, the body. Aquinas
denies, however, that this unmoved moving part—the soul—is abso-
lutely unmovable:
For since every mover [movens] is itself moved [moveatur] by appetite, it
must be that the mover [movor] that is a part of what moves itself moves on
account of appetite for some appetible object that is superior to it in
moving [in movendo]. For what has an appetite [appetens] is a kind of
moved mover [movens motum]y but what is appetible is an altogether
unmoved mover [movens omnino non motum]. Therefore, there must be a
56. Salamucha has pointed out that the second "Aristotelian" proof in SCG is
linked with the proof from the contingency of the world. But he claims that it is for
this reason that Aquinas found it unsatisfactory and abandoned it in favor of the third
way when he wrote ST. See J. Salamucha, "The Proof Ex Motu for the Existence of
God," New; Scholasticism 32 (1958), reprinted in Aquinas: A Collection of Critical
Essays, edited by Anthony Kenny (New York: Anchor Books, 1969), reprint ed.
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), pp. 175-213, p. 117. But I see
no evidence that Aquinas found it unsatisfactory. His statement, "But two [objec-
tions] seem to count against the arguments given above," does not, as Salamucha
supposes, indicate his dissatisfaction with the second proof. It is merely a way of
raising possible objections that he goes on to rebut. On the link between the proof
from motion and the proof from contingency, see section 7, below.
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primary, separate, altogether unmovable mover [pήmum motor em sepa-
ratum omnino immobilem]y which is God. (SCG 1.13.28)57
This argument purports to show that souls cannot be absolutely un-
movable movers: souls are moved by the objects of their appetites. If
there is an absolutely unmovable mover, it cannot be a soul, but must
be an appetible object. But must there be an absolutely unmovable
mover?
Aquinas might be suggesting the following line of reasoning. A soul
cannot after all be a primary mover in a causal series ordered per se,
because it moves with respect to some state S only by virtue of some
appetible object. For example, the hand would not be using the stick
as a lever to pry the stone out of the field if the farmer's soul were not
moving it; the farmer would not be willing that the stone be moved
from his field, however, if he did not desire to grow crops. So it is after
all the farmer's desire to grow crops that accounts for the farmer's
willing and the stone's being moved. If this is what Aquinas has in
mind, then the argument seems intended to show that one has to
move farther along in the causal series to reach a primary mover than
one might have thought. One has to get to an appetible object.
If this is the argument, it is a striking move.58 It is striking because
it is a move from explanation in terms of efficient causality to explana-
tion in terms of final causality. The proof from motus has invoked
efficient causes at each stage until now—the stick that moves the
stone, the hand that moves the stick, and the soul that moves the
hand are all efficient causes of motion. But the appetible object that
moves a soul is a final cause of the soul's motion. Apparently, that is
why Aquinas says "for what has an appetite is a kind of moved mover"
(quodammodo movens motum). It is a "kind of" moved mover because it
is moved by a different sort of causality from that by which the hand or
the stick is moved.59
57. Aquinas attributes this argument to Aristotle in the Metaphysics. See In libros
Metaphysicorum 12.7 for Aquinas's commentary on the relevant text.
58. I am not sure, however, that Aquinas does intend this argument. In his
commentary on the Metaphysics, at least, Aquinas takes it as established (at the end of
12.6 [Cathala-Spiazzi nos. 2517-2518]), on the basis of the arguments from the
Physics I have just sketched, that there is an absolutely unmovable mover whose
substance is actuality. He then argues (in 12.7) that an absolutely unmovable sub-
stance must be an appetible object.
59. Aquinas frequently asserts the principle that the final cause is the cause of all
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Still this argument does not succeed in bridging the gap between
mundane primary movers and the unmovable mover; it simply re^
places one sort of mundane primary mover (souls) with another (ap-
petible objects). The argument gives us no reason to suppose that the
appetible objects that will count as the primary movers are absolutely
unmovable movers.
Of course, final causes as well as efficient causes can be ordered per
se.
60
 The farmer may desire to grow crops only because he desires to
eat, and so on. Some ends, then, will be purely instrumental, but it
seems we will never get to an unmovable mover that is God. The
farthest we can go, even on Aquinas's account, is the farmer's hap-
piness, and then only the farmer's conception of happiness.61 The
farmer's conception of happiness (whatever that is) will be the primary
mover in any causal series ordered per se in which the farmer's will
figures as a moved mover. So there is still a gap between the conceived
ultimate good and God. Moreover, the conceived ultimate good need
not exist at all (except in the conceiver's mind) in order to play its role
as primary mover. The argument from souls to appetible objects, then,
is not sufficient to bridge the gap between mundane primary movers
and the primary mover that is God.
Perhaps Aquinas intends the move from souls to appetible objects
to lead in another direction. In the fourth way (ST 1.2.3), he argues
to the existence of God from the existence of things that are good or
noble to some degree or in some respect. If that proof works, then we
have a way of getting from appetible objects to the existence of God:
appetible objects are good to some degree, and so they constitute a
the other causes. See, for instance, his In Posteήorum Analyticorum 1.16: "But causes
are arranged in a definite order to one another: for the account of one [cause] depends
on another. Thus an account of the matter depends on the form. . . . Moreover, an
agent accounts for the form. . . . Finally, it is on the end that the account of the
agent depends." This general principle squares with the line of reasoning I am suggest'
ing.
60. See, e.g., ST 1-2.1.4.
61. For discussion of Aquinas's views on the role of final causes in human intention
and action, see my "Egoistic Rationalism: Aquinas's Basis for Christian Morality," in
Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, edited by Michael Beaty (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 327-354; and "Ultimate Ends in Practical
Reasoning: Aquinas's Aristotelian Moral Psychology and Anscombe's Fallacy," The
Philosophical Review 100 (1991).
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starting point for the fourth way. But if the proof from motion must be
completed by appeal to the fourth way, it will be invalid on its own.
It seems, then, that the proof from motion is incomplete. It may be
that the third or fourth way will fill the lacuna in the proof, but in any
case it is essentially parasitic on some other proof for God's existence.
I have suggested that there is evidence in SCG 1.13
indicating that Aquinas was aware of the problem of mundane primary
movers. In his presentation of the second "Aristotelian" proof, he
acknowledges that the claim that there is a primary mover that is not
moved by anything exterior to it does not entail that there is a primary
mover that is completely unmovable. He proceeds to offer supplemen-
tary considerations that do, in his view, imply the latter claim. Now
this development in the discussion of the second "Aristotelian" proof
occurs only after the presentation of the first proof has been completed
with the explicit conclusion that there is a primary unmovable mover,
and so it might seem that Aquinas does not see the lacuna in the first
proof.62 It seems to me plausible, however, to suppose that he was
aware of the parasitic nature of the first "Aristotelian" proof and that
he left it unremarked in view of the forthcoming supplementary dis-
cussion.
There is some interesting evidence in ST 1.2.3 that supports this
assumption. As I have said, the presentation of the first way in ST
differs in only two respects from the presentation of the first "Aristo-
telian" proof in SCG. The first of these—the fact that in ST Aquinas
incorporates two of the subarguments from SCG into the main body of
the proof—is relatively unimportant. But the second difference—the
fact that Aquinas states the conclusion of the proof differently in the
two presentations—seems to me significant. In ST he concludes, not
that there is some primary unmovable mover, but only that there is
some primary mover that is not moved by anything.63 This latter
62. There is a question, of course, about how the second stage of the second
Aristotelian proof might relate to the first Aristotelian proof. These arguments
are for the most part taken from Physics 8 (257a35 if.), from the text immediately
following that which provides the proof from motion. See Aquinas's in libros
Physicorum 8.9-12.
63. This way of stating the conclusion is quite close to that at the end of the first
stage of the second Aristotelian proof in SCG 1.13. ST: "Ergo necesse est devenire ad
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statement of the conclusion is weaker than the former, and in just the
way we would expect if Aquinas were aware of the problem of muri'
dane primary movers.
If I am right that Aquinas saw the problem of mundane primary
movers and that his drawing only the weak conclusion to the first way
shows his awareness of it, then we are left with two other exegetical
questions. First, why does Aquinas suppose, later in ST> that he has
established the strong, modal conclusion that the primary mover is
unmovable? In texts just following the presentation of the five ways,
for instance, he claims that he has shown that there is some primary
unmovable principle (ST 1.2.3 ad 2) and that there is some primary
unmovable mover (ST 1.3.1). It might seem that Aquinas thinks that
the first way warrants this stronger claim even if he did not state it as
the first way's explicit conclusion.
I think this explanation is incorrect, and I think the context of
Aquinas's later claims in fact supports my thesis. I have argued that
Aquinas would be entitled to the stronger, modal version of the con-
clusion only after the proof from motion has been supplemented by
other proofs, perhaps the third or the fourth way. The fact that in ST
Aquinas makes the modal claim only after the presentation of the five
ways (and so after the presentation of the third and fourth ways)
shows, I think, that he takes the first way to be parasitic on these
other proofs in just the way I have suggested. He draws only the weak
version of the conclusion at the end of the first way because he sees
that it is all he is entitled to. Then, after he has filled the lacuna in the
aliquod primum movens quod a nullo movetur." Second Aristotelian proof: "Ergo
relinquitur quod oportet ponere aliquod primum quod non movetur aliquo exteriori."
In SCG Aquinas explicitly acknowledges that this conclusion is an inadequate stop-
ping point for a proof for God's existence. See my discussion in the sixth section,
above. Notice that the conclusion given in ST is ambiguous. Given my analysis of the
proof from motion, I think it should be read as the claim that there is some primary
mover that is not being moved by anything with respect to S, where S is the end-state
of the motion identified in the proof's observation premise. It might alternatively be
read as the stronger claim that there is some primary mover that is not moved by
anything in any respect. Taken in the latter way, I think the conclusion is unwar-
ranted by the proof (for the reasons given in the sixth section, above). Even if we read
it this way, however, it is still weaker than the modal version of the conclusion stated
in SCG. It does not follow from the fact that something is unmoved that it is
unmovable.
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proof with the third or fourth way, he goes on to state and use the
stronger, modal conclusion.
This interpretation of Aquinas's procedure seems to me to be
clearly supported by a close look at the first appearance of the modal
claim in ST. It occurs in his reply to the second objection in ST 1.2.3.
The objection argues that it is unnecessary to suppose that God exists
since all features of the world can be explained by appealing either to
nature or human reason and will—in effect, by appealing only to
mundane primary movers. Aquinas replies that nature must be di-
rected by a higher agent, God, and that human reason and will must
be explained by a higher cause, too. This is because human reason and
will "are changeable and corruptible [mutabίlia et defectabilia]. But all
things that are changeable and susceptible to corruption [deficere pos-
sibilia] must be traced back to some primary principle that is unmov-
able and of itself necessary, as has been shown" (ST 1.2.3. ad 2). In
my view the striking feature of this part of Aquinas's reply is his
conjoining the starting points and conclusions of two of the five ways,
the proof from motion and the proof from contingency.64 The starting
point of this little argument is that human reason and will are both
changeable and corruptible, and its conclusion is that there must be
something that is both unmovable and of itself necessary. Aquinas has
run together the first and the third ways, and it is here—with the first
and third ways simultaneously called to mind—that he first claims
that the primary mover must be unmovable. I think this is not in-
advertent but, rather, shows that Aquinas knows that the first way is
parasitic on the third.
The second exegetical question raised by my claim that Aquinas
knew that the first way is a parasitic cosmological argument is why he
chose to include it in ST among his proofs for God's existence. If it is
essentially parasitic on the third or fourth ways, why not simply pre-
sent these latter proofs, leaving the former aside altogether? More-
over, why would he present it as the clearest of the five ways when he
knows that it is not a complete way at all?
64. To call a thing defectabile might be to say that it is corruptible either in the
sense that it can go out of existence or in the sense that it can be flawed or suffer
imperfection. The latter sense might call to mind the possibility of degrees of goodness
or nobility, in which case the reply to the second objection would connect the first
way with the fourth.
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The answer, I think, is that he takes the proof from motion to
be the clearest of the five ways not in the sense that it is the easiest
way of proving God's existence but in the sense that it begins from the
most readily accessible phenomena. Ordinary processes of change are
ready to hand, immediately obvious to the senses, in a way that the
contingency of things, their degrees of nobility, and their being re-
lated in a providential world order are not. A plainer starting point
cannot be had.
So Aquinas would have straightforward strategic reasons for open-
ing his discussion of the proofs for God's existence with a proof that
begins from phenomena that are obvious to anyone.65 He also has
theoretical reasons for starting with a proof that begins from what is
obvious to the senses. Aquinas's empirically based theological meth-
odology requires us to proceed toward knowledge of God on the basis
of God's sensible effects; Aquinas's Aristotelian empiricism requires us
to proceed toward what is knowable in itself on the basis of what is
better known to us, namely, what is obvious to the senses. Each of the
five ways starts from God's sensible effects, and it would be natural for
Aquinas to begin the five ways as a whole with a proof that starts from
the most obvious of those effects.
Aquinas must have thought that these strategic and theoretical
considerations in favor of the first way outweighed the difficulty pre-
sented by the parasitical nature of the proof. The first way by itself could
not resolve the issue raised in ST 1.2.3 ("Does God exist?"), but it can
contribute to the discussion by preparing the way for the independent
proofs that follow it. After all, the proof is not seriously flawed, only
incomplete. Aquinas intended his readers to find the completion of the
proof in the immediately succeeding paragraphs of ST.66
University of Iowa
65. These strategic reasons would be all the stronger if his intention in ST is to
provide a manual for the teaching of theology.
66. I am grateful to Evan Fales, Alfred Freddoso, and Norman Kretzmann for
comments on earlier versions of this paper.
